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Abstract: In this study, we examine the effects of tariff reduction on firms’ quality upgrading by 
employing an Indonesian plant-product-level panel dataset matched with a plant-level dataset. We 
explore the effects of lower output and input tariffs separately, by focusing on the apparel industry. 
By estimating the Berry-type demand function, we derive product-quality indicators based on the 
Khandelwal (Review of Economic Studies, 2010) methodology, which enables us to isolate quality 
upgrading from changes in prices. Our findings are as follows. First, a reduction in output tariffs 
does not affect product quality upgrading. Second, a reduction in input tariffs boosts quality 
upgrading in general. In particular, this impact is greater for import firms, which is consistent with 
the fact that the source of the boost is the import of high-quality foreign inputs.  
Keywords: Trade liberalization, Input trade, Quality upgrading 
JEL Classification: F13, F14, O32 
                                                                                  
 
1. Introduction 
The impact of trade liberalization in the home country on corporate performance has 
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been studied by policy makers as well as researchers. This is because both export-led 
growth and import-led growth have emerged as important tools of development 
strategies (see, for example, Lawrence and Weinstein, 1999). However, the gains from 
trade liberalization in the home country and its channels of transmission, have not yet 
been adequately explained. For example, on the one hand, lowering the tariff on a 
product lowers production costs for firms that use that product as inputs. Such a 
reduction of “input tariffs” may also improve firms’ output quality through the import of 
high-quality inputs. On the other hand, domestic market oriented firms may face fierce 
competition against imported goods. Under such reduction of “output tariffs,” some 
firms may boost the quality of their output to escape the competition from imports. In 
short, the effects of tariff reduction on domestic firms’ output will vary. 
In this paper, we examine these effects of a reduction in tariffs on firms’ quality 
upgrading by employing an Indonesian plant-product-level panel dataset matched with a 
plant-level dataset. In particular, we explore the effects of a reduction in output and 
input tariffs separately. We focus on the apparel industry for the following reasons. First, 
the Indonesian apparel industry has faced fierce competition from China especially after 
the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2005. Second, although 
plant-product-level data are notoriously noisy, data for the apparel industry is relatively 
well organized. For example, although product quantities in our dataset are based on 
different types of units even within a nine-digit level of product classification, in the 
case of the apparel industry, there are only a few quantity units within a detailed product 
classification. By estimating a Berry-type demand function, we derive product-quality 
indicators based on the Khandelwal (2010) methodology, which enables us to isolate 
quality upgrades from changes in prices.  
It is important, particularly for Indonesia, to clarify these effects of trade 
liberalization in the home country. Recently, the idea of more FTAs has drawn some 
negative views. These are, in part, because of the dramatic increase in imports from 
China in the wake of the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA). Indeed, the ACFTA may be 
having various kinds of impacts on Indonesian firms. On the one hand, for example, 
since on average input quality is not very different between China and Indonesia, a 
lowering of tariffs on inputs from China may not lead to a quality upgrading in 
Indonesian firms. On the other hand, a lowering of tariffs on output may have a 
significant impact on quality upgrading to escape the fiercer competition with respect to 
that output. The analysis presented in this study contributes to uncovering how 
Indonesian manufacturing firms react to the tariff reduction at home through FTAs in 
terms of quality upgrading. 
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This study is built on various strands of other studies. First, it is related to 
empirical studies on the nexus between trade liberalization and product quality, which 
has been explored by Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) and Fernandes and Paunov (2013). 
Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) estimate a Berry-type demand function using 
cross-country US import data and derive product-quality indicators. They then provide 
macro-level evidence that tariff reduction induces product quality upgrading especially 
for products closer to the technology frontier. Fernandes and Paunov (2013) use Chilean 
firm-product level data and investigate the effect of transport-cost reduction on product 
quality measured by unit values, and find that transport-cost reduction promotes product 
quality upgrading. However, they do not consider the effects of changes in input tariffs 
separately from the effects of changes in output tariffs. 
The second group of related studies uses firm-level productivity measures and 
examines the impact of trade liberalization at the firm level. For example, Amiti and 
Konings (2007) use Indonesian plant-level data and investigate the impact of output and 
input tariff reduction on total factor productivity (TFP). They find that input tariff 
reduction induces productivity improvement especially for importing firms and that the 
impact is at least twice as great as that of output tariff reduction. The TFP is a so-called 
revenue productivity measure, which uses the revenue deflated by the industry average 
price as an output measure. Since product price and quality vary by firms in the 
differentiated-products sector, the revenue productivity may reflect differences in 
product quality and market structure as well as in cost efficiency. Therefore, the impact 
of trade liberalization on revenue productivity may capture both the improvement in 
cost efficiency and quality upgrading. In this study, we focus on the effect of trade 
liberalization on quality upgrading instead of TFP growth and attempt to examine 
whether the result of the effect on TFP growth in Amiti and Konings (2007) comes 
partially from the effect on quality upgrading. 
Third, we complement recent empirical studies that estimate the Berry-type 
demand function from firm/plant-level data. Examples include Smeets et al. (2014) and 
Bernini et al. (2015). Smeets et al. (2014) use Danish apparel manufacturers’ product 
data and investigate how Danish firms respond to China’s accession to the WTO. They 
demonstrate that the distribution of quality tightened up owing to increased pressure 
from international competition. Bernini et al. (2015) explore the heterogeneous response 
to real exchange-rate fluctuations based on product quality using Italian firm-level trade 
data. Their findings suggest that while those exporters that use imported inputs 
intensively are able to offset exchange-rate variations, this effect is weaker for firms 
importing high-quality inputs. However, we focus on the effects of tariff reduction on 
4 
 
firms’ quality upgrading. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical 
methodology. After introducing our data sources in Section 3, we report our empirical 
results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
In our empirical study, we regress the measure of quality at plant-product level on 
output and input tariff changes as well as plant-related characteristics to examine the 
effects of trade liberalization on product quality upgrading. Therefore, a key issue is 
how to obtain plant-product-level quality. As mentioned in the Introduction, we follow 
Khandelwal (2010) and Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). 1 Namely, we use Berry’s 
discrete choice framework, which is common in recent empirical literature on industrial 
organization. 
Assume consumers have a choice between two levels of differentiated goods as 
illustrated in Figure 1. They can choose to buy from any of the product groups (e.g., 
outerwear, underwear, or sportswear). They can further decide to go with a particular 
variety, i.e., with a product produced by a certain plant in that group. We assume that 
each individual n consumes one unit of variety (i) that has the highest utility: 
𝑢𝑛𝑛 > 𝑢𝑛𝑛 , ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑔, 
where g indicates a product or a group of varieties. We call g a “nest.” We assume that 
the indirect utility function for product i for consumer n is as follows: 
 
𝑢𝑛𝑖 = 𝑧𝑛𝑖 − 𝛼𝑃𝑛𝑖 + 𝜁𝑛𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑖,                                       (1) 
where Pit is the price for variety i in year t, which is measured by unit values (i.e., 
values divided by quantity). zit captures the quality factors. ζigt and εnit are the valuation 
of utility by consumer n for variety i for different nests of varieties and across varieties 
belonging to the same nest, respectively. σ is the within-group correlation in consumer 
taste for varieties i. We assume that εnit follows an identical independent type I extreme 
value distribution. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
      Berry (1994) shows that the market share of variety i is given by: 
                                                   
1 Explanations for the quality-measure estimation are based on Hayakawa et al. (2014). 
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𝑠𝑛𝑖 = exp [(𝑧𝑛𝑖 − 𝛼𝑃𝑛𝑖)/(1 − 𝜎)]∑ exp [(𝑧𝑛𝑖 − 𝛼𝑃𝑛𝑖)/(1 − 𝜎)]𝑛∈𝑖
∙
∑ [exp[(𝑧𝑛𝑖 − 𝛼𝑃𝑛𝑖) (1 − 𝜎)⁄ ]]1−𝜎𝑛∈𝑖
∑ ∑ [exp[(𝑧𝑛𝑖 − 𝛼𝑃𝑛𝑖) (1 − 𝜎)⁄ ]]1−𝜎𝑛∈𝑖𝑖 .             (2) 
This demand system is completed by introducing an outside good; the consumers may 
decide not to purchase any of the varieties. Assuming that εnit follows an identical 
independent type I extreme value distribution, Berry demonstrates that the log 
difference between sit and the market share of an outside variety sOt can be written in 
linear form: 
 ln𝑠𝑛𝑖 − ln𝑠𝑂𝑖 = −α𝑃𝑛𝑖 + 𝑧𝑛𝑖 + 𝜎 ln 𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑖 ,                                      (3) 
where sit is the market share for variety i in year t, and sot is the share of “outside goods” 
in year t. Pit is the price and sigt is the nest share, namely the share of variety i within 
product group g. We assume that product quality zit may be decomposed into three 
factors, δt + δi + δit, namely time fixed effects, variety fixed effects, and the variety-time 
deviation from fixed effects, respectively. We control the first two factors by time and 
plant-product fixed effects. We consider the third factor δit as residuals. The equation to 
be estimated becomes: 
 ln𝑠𝑛𝑖 − ln𝑠𝑂𝑖 = −α𝑃𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑛 + 𝜎 ln 𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝑛𝑖.                        (4) 
 
Once we obtain the estimates in equation (4), product quality is recovered using the 
following equation:  
𝑄�𝑛𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑛 + 𝛿𝑛𝑖.                                                            (5) 
Because price and nest share are endogenous variables, we estimate equation (4) 
using instrumental variable (IV) estimation techniques. Four instrument variables are 
used. First, we use the average price for competing varieties provided by other firms for 
variety i, which is the instrument of product prices. The changes in competitors’ prices 
may affect the pricing strategies of a firm but will be independent of firms’ product 
quality since it is not easy to adjust product quality immediately after competitors’ price 
changes. Second, supply-side information is often used as an instrument variable when 
estimating a demand function. We use the average electricity price as an instrument for 
prices. Third, we use two indicators related to the competitive environment for each 
market as instrument variables for the nest share (sigt), namely the number of competing 
varieties in the same market and the number of products provided by the same firm. 
Using the above estimates on quality, we examine how changes in output and 
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input tariffs affect firms’ quality upgrading by estimating the following equation (we 
omit a subscript on plants): 
 ln𝑄𝑛𝑖+1 − ln𝑄𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑂𝑢𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝐗𝑖𝑖𝛄 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖,           (6) 
where Outtariffgt and Intariffgt represent the output and input tariffs for a product or 
group of variety g in year t, respectively. X indicates a vector of control variables, 
including trade status dummy variables (e.g., exporter dummy or importer dummy) and 
a log of output values. The exporter dummy takes the value one if a product concerned 
is exported, whereas the importer dummy does that if a plant imports any products. We 
include year-island fixed effects, φtl, to control for some differences in quality upgrading 
across regions (Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and others). This equation is our 
baseline equation and is estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
By interacting firms’ trade status with these tariff variables, we also examine the 
different effects of tariffs on quality upgrading. If the effect of input tariffs is sourced 
from the greater use of foreign inputs of higher quality, import firms are more likely to 
be affected. Similarly, if output tariffs provide the motivation for escaping the 
competition posed by imported output, the impact on exporters will be smaller because 
they do not compete with imported output in the domestic market. To investigate these 
heterogeneous effects, we introduce the interaction terms between export status and 
output tariffs and between import status and input tariffs. 
Following Amiti and Khandelwal (2013), we also control the distance to quality 
frontier (proximity to frontier) in t. This variable is the ratio of quality, Qit, to the 
maximum quality within a product group-year, which is defined as: 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃 𝑂𝑃 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑓𝑂𝑛𝑖 = 𝑄𝑛𝑖 max𝑛∈𝑖[𝑄𝑛𝑖]⁄ .                          (7) 
We also include its interaction terms with Outtariff and Intariff. We expect proximity to 
frontier in year t to have a negative coefficient because low-quality producers catch up 
faster. That is, the interaction terms of proximity to frontier with tariffs may capture the 
“discouragement” effect of competition, as suggested by Aghion et al. (2009). This 
means that increased competition may discourage firms far from the technology frontier 
from upgrading their product quality because they know that it would be difficult to 
survive even if they engaged in more innovation. If this effect works, the coefficients of 
the interaction terms will be negative. 
 
 
3. Data Issues 
We now introduce our data sources. We first report those for our basic variables on 
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plants and plant products. Then, we provide details of the computation of our tariff 
variables. 
 
3.1. Data 
Two datasets are available for Indonesian manufacturing. One dataset contains 
production and cost information at a plant level, including the total number of workers, 
the amount of capital stock, total value of production, value added, costs of material 
inputs and labor, and the value and quantity of electricity used. Another one is a more 
unique plant-product-level dataset. It reports the value, quantity, and export share of 
each product produced by a plant, as well as the nine-digit level of the Commodity 
Classification of Indonesia (KKI: Klasifikasi Komoditi Indonesia).2 Both datasets are 
drawn from annual surveys by Indonesia’s Statistical Agency (BPS-Statistics), which 
cover manufacturing plants with 20 or more workers. Using a common 
plant-identification code, we can merge the two datasets and estimate demand and 
quality equations by taking advantage of each dataset. 
For our empirical analysis, which uses these datasets, “product,” “nest,” and 
“outside goods” are defined as follows. At the most disaggregated level, differences of 
apparel products are identified as type of product (e.g., overcoats/suits/…, etc.), for 
men/women, fabric used, method of making (e.g., knitted or crocheted/others), and 
batik/non-batik. In our empirical analysis, “product” is defined based on the type of 
product and sex, ignoring other differences. To estimate the nested logit model in 
equation (4), we have to define “group of variety” or “nests” prior to estimation. In our 
analysis, “nest” is defined the same as “product.” 3  Therefore, the underlying 
assumption of consumers’ decisions is that they first decide whether to purchase 
domestic products, then choose a “product” (=“nest”), and finally choose a producer 
(=“variety”). As in previous studies, imported products that correspond to domestic 
products are treated as “outside goods,” which is an option for consumers to purchase 
                                                   
2 The first five digits of the KKI correspond to the Indonesian Standard Industrial Classification 
(KBLI), which is a modified version of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (ISIC) Rev 3, to accommodate the specific conditions of manufacturing in 
Indonesia. Most of the four-digit KBLI codes correspond to the ISIC four-digit codes, except for clay 
product industries. 
3 Indonesia’s domestic apparel market that is analyzed here consists of 36 “nests” (see Table A1 in 
Appendix). Apparel for babies and accessories are excluded from our sample. 
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when they decide not to purchase domestic apparel products.4 
Under these definitions, and the above two datasets, we construct the 
plant-product-level panel dataset for our empirical analysis. First, we check units used 
to report quantity in each record. In more than 97.5 percent of the total records, quantity 
is reported in terms of pieces. For consistency, we drop those records in which quantity 
is reported in units other than pieces. Second, several plants are excluded from our 
sample because they report an unreliably large value or quantity of production. In 
addition, this dataset contains data for non-respondents, whose value of production and 
employment are estimated by BPS-Statistics. We exclude observations for 
non-respondents. 5  Third, the value and quantity (in pieces) of plants’ products 
classified at the nine-digit KKI are aggregated according to the definition of “products” 
by plant and year. Fourth, using the aggregated records, we create a plant-product-level 
panel dataset. Finally, to the panel dataset, we add plant-level variables, including the 
value of total production, export status, and import status. 
Using this plant-product-level panel dataset, we compute all variables except for 
tariff variables and the variable on outside goods. The price variable (Pit) is calculated 
as total value divided by quantity for each product. As in the product-level data in other 
countries, the unit price variable contains somewhat noisy observations. Therefore, 
before running regressions, observations outside the two-sided 90 percent confidence 
interval of the unit price in logarithm for each product have been dropped from the 
sample while estimating the demand equation.  
 
3.2. Output and input tariff rates 
As a WTO member, Indonesia has attempted to reduce its tariff rates since the 
mid-1990s. The MFN tariff rates imposed on apparel products at the nine-digit KKI 
ranged from 25 to 30 percent in 1996. By 2001, this had declined to 10 to 15 percent. A 
rough comparison with other manufacturing products in Indonesia shows that the 
apparel industry, and the textile industry that has been its main supplier, has been highly 
protected. According to the WTO (2003), the average MFN rates on “textile and 
clothing” were 14.6 and 10.5 percent in 1998 and 2002, respectively, while the average 
rates on industrial products were 9.7 and 7.0 percent during the same period. The 
                                                   
4 Because the units used to measure quantity in the dataset are different from that in trade data, we 
calculate the share of “outside goods” (sOt) as import penetration (in terms of value) following Amiti 
and Khandelwal (2013), instead of calculating quantity share. Import penetration is calculated as the 
total value of imports divided by the sum of the values of imports and domestic production. 
5 As a result, 34 percent of the total records were dropped. 
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average tariff rates on textile and clothing were the fourth highest, after transport 
equipment, prepared food, and footwear. 
Although the MFN rates on apparel products have not changed since 2001, 
Indonesia has continued to liberalize its trade regime through FTAs. Under the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, tariffs on 
apparel imports from other ASEAN economies were reduced to 5 percent by 2001. By 
2009, before the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) went into force in 2010, 
all of the tariffs on apparel products were eliminated. In addition, as a member of 
ASEAN, Indonesia established FTAs with China (in 2005), Korea (in 2007), and India 
(in 2010). Indonesia also established the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement with 
Japan (JIEPA, in 2008). Comparing preferential tariff rates on apparel products under 
these schemes in 2010, we find that all of the 499 apparel products at the nine-digit KKI 
are tariff free under ATIGA and JIEPA, while the average tariff rate and the percentage 
of tariff-free products are 5.1 percent and 41 percent, respectively, under the 
ASEAN-China FTA. The corresponding averages and percentages are 3.9 percent and 
50 percent under the ASEAN-Korea FTA, and 14.2 percent and 0 percent under the 
ASEAN-India FTA. 
Given this backdrop, we examine the following two kinds of tariff variables: 
input tariffs and output tariffs. The input tariffs (Intariffgt) for “product” or group of 
variety g in year t are computed as a weighted average of tariffs on inputted products: 
𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂g𝑖 = �𝑤ℎ𝑖 × 𝑂𝑢𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑖∗
ℎ
, 
where Outtariff*ht is output tariffs in year t for industry h at a four-digit level of ISIC 
Revision 3, and whg is the cost share of manufacturing inputs from industry h for 
producers of products in the variety g group. To calculate the cost share, we first 
identify plants producing products in the variety g group. Then, for these plants, we 
calculate the average cost share of manufacturing inputs from industry h using detailed 
input information for each plant from the same sources as the plant-level dataset. 
The output tariffs at a four-digit level of ISIC, which are used to construct Intariff, 
are computed as follows. First, we identify tariff rates in all tariff schemes including 
preferential schemes such as FTAs in Indonesia. The tariff-line level data are obtained 
from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.6 We use tariff-equivalent 
rates for non–ad valorem tariff products. Second, at a tariff-line level, we identify the 
                                                   
6 Unfortunately, in the WITS database, Indonesia does not report the tariff rates for JIEPA, which is 
the FTA with the country that has the third-largest export values to Indonesia. Thus, we obtain this 
data from the legal text of the FTA between Japan and Indonesia. 
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lowest tariff rates among all schemes available for each country when exporting to 
Indonesia. Third, tariff rates at the tariff-line level are converted to those at the 
four-digit level of ISIC using the conversion table available on the website of United 
Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). We apply the simple average for this aggregation. 
Furthermore, we modify the ISIC classification to match the industry classification 
(KBLI) in Indonesia. Lastly, the tariff rates in all countries are aggregated to single tariff 
rates by employing the share of import values from each country in total imports as a 
weight. The weight is based on import values mid-sample i.e., 2006. These data are 
obtained from the World Trade Atlas. 
Apart from using the output tariffs at a four-digit level of ISIC to compute the 
input tariffs, we need to calculate output tariffs for “product” or the variety g group 
(Outtariffgt) to analyze the impact of output tariff reduction on quality upgrading. First, 
we identify tariff line codes corresponding to the apparel products at the nine-digit level 
of the KKI based on information on the type of product, for men/women, fabric used, 
method of making, and batik/non-batik. Second, at a tariff-line level, we identify the 
lowest tariff rates as explained above. Third, tariff rates at the tariff-line level are 
converted to those at the “product” level. Lastly, these tariff rates in all countries are 
similarly aggregated to single tariff rates using weights of import values. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We now report our estimation results. We first show the results of estimating the 
demand function to obtain our quality estimates. We then provide the results of 
estimating the effects of output and input tariffs on quality upgrading. 
 
4.1. Demand estimation and quality estimates 
First, we estimate the demand function. The results are presented in Table 1. We run 
OLS and IV regression for the sake of comparison. Consistent with the theoretical 
requirements in our demand function, both OLS and IV estimates for a price coefficient 
are negative and significant, whereas those for a nest share coefficient are significant 
and lie between zero and one. First stage F- test statistics for both price and nest share 
are high enough to reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are jointly zero, 
suggesting that the instrumental variables have some power. Hansen J-test statistics 
rejects the null hypothesis for over-identification, but it is not clear if the reason for 
rejection is that the instrumental variable is invalid or that it is probably owing to a large 
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number of observations.7 As expected, the absolute magnitude of the price and nest 
share coefficients is larger in OLS than in IV estimation probably because both price 
and nest share are correlated with unobserved quality and suffer from bias. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
We use IV estimates of the demand function to construct the quality estimates 
following equation (5). Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the impact of 
changes in tariffs, we examine the relationship of prices with quality and plant size in 
terms of output values, as in Smeets et al. (2014). The results are presented in Table 2. 
We control for year fixed effects and product fixed effects in columns (I) and (II), 
whereas year fixed effects and plant-product fixed effects are controlled for in column 
(III). In all specifications, plant sizes are positively correlated with prices. Furthermore, 
as found in columns (II) and (III), there is a significantly positive correlation between 
prices and quality, implying that the widely used measure of quality, i.e., prices, at least 
partly plays a role of proxy for the quality. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
4.2. Impact of tariff on price and quality 
We now report our estimation of equation (6).8 Before estimating for quality upgrading, 
as in previous studies, we estimate for price changes (i.e., ln Pit+1− ln Pit) for the 
purpose of comparison. After reporting the results for price changes, we present the 
estimation results for quality changes. 
The result for price changes is shown in column (I) in Table 3. While the 
coefficient for output tariffs is insignificant, that for input tariffs is estimated to be 
significantly negative. That is, while the reduction of input tariffs raises product prices, 
there is no effect when output tariffs are reduced. The coefficients for the trade status 
dummies, i.e., exporter dummy and importer dummy, are insignificant. In this equation, 
we also include a variable of proximity to frontier, which is specified like equation (7) 
but is evaluated in terms of price rather than quality. Its coefficient is estimated to be 
significantly negative, indicating that plants closer to the frontier experience a smaller 
rise in product prices. The coefficient for plant size in terms of output is insignificant. 
                                                   
7 As suggested by Nevo (2001), it is known that the test of over-identification is often rejected when 
the number of observations is large. 
8 Basic statistics are available in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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===   Table 3   === 
 
The results of the estimation for quality upgrading are presented in column (II) 
and are similar to those for price changes shown in column (I). Thus, we may say that 
most of the results for price changes come from the effects on quality upgrading. The 
insignificant result for the exporter dummy implies that there are no significant 
differences in quality upgrading between non-exporters and exporters. This may be 
because, as pointed out in Chongbo (2007), the textile and garment industry in 
Indonesia was over-dependent on the quota system (known as the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA)) and the American market.9 Specifically, exporters may have been 
reluctant to pursue quality upgrading. The coefficients for the importer dummy and 
proximity to frontier are estimated to be significantly positive and negative, respectively. 
Therefore, importers and the plants with quality farther from the frontier have 
high-quality upgrading. The latter result indicates convergence in quality across plants. 
The results on tariffs are as follows. First, the reduction of output tariffs does not 
affect firms’ quality upgrading. There are at least two possible reasons. One is that our 
variable on output tariffs does not change much across products and over time, 
especially when compared with that on input tariffs.10 The other is that significant 
effects of output tariffs appear once plants invest in machines for manufacturing in order 
to differentiate their output from imported products. However, it is difficult for firms in 
Indonesia to do that because local banks have generally avoided lending to the textile 
industry owing to high risks (Chongbo, 2007). Second, as expected, reducing input 
tariffs boosts quality upgrading. That is, lower prices for imported inputs encourage 
firms to increase imports, thereby boosting the upgrade of their output quality.  
In column (III), we introduce various interaction terms with tariff variables. While 
the interaction term of output tariffs with the exporter dummy has an insignificant 
coefficient, that of input tariffs with the importer dummy is negatively significant. The 
former result indicates that both non-exporters and exporters do not boost their quality 
upgrading. The latter result implies that our above interpretation of the result in input 
                                                   
9 The abolishing of MFA may affect our results. Therefore, we also estimate the model with the 
interaction terms of our variables with the MFA dummy, which takes the value one for years before 
2005 and zero otherwise. We obtain insignificant results in the interaction term between the MFA 
dummy and the exporter dummy. These estimation results are available upon request.  
10 For example, the average change in output and input tariffs from 2001 to 2010 are 2.0 and 0.8 
percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, in 2010, the coefficient of variance is 0.13 in output 
tariffs and 0.19 for input tariffs. 
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tariffs is more valid for importers. However, even after including such an interaction 
term, the coefficient for input tariffs is still significantly negative, implying that 
non-importers also boost quality upgrading when input tariffs are reduced. Again, there 
are two possible interpretations for this result. One is that non-importers may purchase 
lower-priced foreign inputs through trading companies. The other is the competition 
effect in inputs—namely, the increase of imports of lower-priced foreign inputs lowers 
the prices of inputs produced domestically. Such a lowering of input costs may enable 
non-importers to invest in the machines for upgrading.11 
We also do some other estimations. First, we introduce the interaction terms of 
tariff variables with the proximity to frontier. The results are reported in column (I) of 
Table 4. There is no qualitative change in the results for the original variables. The new 
interaction terms have insignificant results. That is, we do not find the effects of tariffs 
based on proximity to frontier. Second, we estimate our model for small- and 
large-sized plants separately. We split the estimation sample based on whether the 
overtime average of plant-level output values is greater than the median among all 
plants or not. The results are reported in columns (II) and (III). We can see that the 
result for the larger-sized plants is similar to that in Table 3. The coefficients for input 
tariffs and their interaction term with the importer dummy are found to be negatively 
significant. The former result may be because larger-sized plants, i.e., plants producing 
a larger volume of output, reduce the (variable) costs for inputs to a greater extent and 
thus are more likely to invest in machines for upgrading. The latter result may indicate 
that the larger-sized plants are better at generating an output of higher quality that uses 
better quality foreign inputs. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examined the effects of lowering tariffs on firms’ quality upgrading by 
employing an Indonesian plant-product-level panel dataset matched with a plant-level 
dataset. In particular, we explored separately the effects of a reduction in output and 
input tariffs. The top three important factors for economic growth are technology, labor, 
and capital. In particular, the enhancement of technology is crucially important for 
                                                   
11 We also tried to differentiate existing exporters/importers from new exporters/importers by 
introducing the interaction terms of tariff variables with the new exporter/importer dummy. However, 
such terms have insignificant results. These estimation results are available upon request.  
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developing countries since capital has become much more mobile across countries, and 
developing countries usually have many low-wage laborers. One form of such 
technology enhancement is to upgrade firms’ product quality. Therefore, our analysis 
has important implications for developing countries. Employing the Khandelwal (2010) 
methodology, we estimated a Berry-type nested logit demand function for Indonesian 
domestic apparel products and derived product-quality indicators that enable us to 
isolate quality upgrading from changes in prices. 
Our main findings are twofold. One is that the reduction of output tariffs does not 
boost quality upgrading by firms producing that output. This result should not be 
interpreted as an encouragement to governments not to liberalize trade in those goods. 
Rather, it may indicate that reducing output tariffs leads to quality upgrading only if 
other necessary conditions for upgrading, such as capital investment, are met. The other 
is that reducing input tariffs boosts quality upgrading in all firms through inputting more 
foreign goods and/or lowering domestic costs via the competition effect. Thus, it is 
highly recommended to liberalize trade in goods in order to boost firms’ quality 
upgrading. 
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Table 1. Demand Function Estimation 
(I) (II)
OLS IV
ln Price -0.0025*** -0.0643**
(0.0002) (0.0285)
ln Nest share 0.8333*** 0.8359***
(0.0099) (0.2141)
Number of Observations 9,791 9,791
R-squared 0.9021
Number of plant-product 2,928 2,928
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.0002
First stage F-value (Price) 20.73
First stage F-value (Nest share) 15.64  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log difference between the shares of a domestic good and an 
outside good. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, 
respectively. In parenthesis is the robust standard error. 
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Table 2. Price–Quality Correlation Estimation 
(I) (II) (III)
ln Quality 0.2401*** 0.2356***
(0.002) (0.005)
ln Output 0.1082*** 0.0227*** 0.0146*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
Number of observations 9,791 9,791 9,791
R-squared 0.141 0.682 0.679
Number of plant-product 2,928
Year-Island Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Product Fixed Effect YES YES No
Plant-product Fixed Effect No No YES  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of prices. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. In parenthesis is the robust standard error. 
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Table 3. Baseline Estimation 
(I) (II) (III)
Dependent Variable Price Quality Quality
Outtariff -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0006
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
   * Exporter dummy -0.0010
(0.004)
Intariff -0.0196* -0.0103*** -0.0084**
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
   * Importer dummy -0.0244*
(0.013)
Exporter dummy 0.0172 0.0106 0.0243
(0.032) (0.010) (0.054)
Importer dummy 0.0346 0.0221* 0.2130**
(0.036) (0.013) (0.102)
Proximity to frontier -0.8239*** -0.2873*** -0.2896***
(0.061) (0.024) (0.024)
ln Output -0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0036
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of observations 4,562 4,562 4,562
R-squared 0.083 0.213 0.214  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log difference of prices/quality. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. In parenthesis is the robust 
standard error. In all specifications, year-island fixed effects are included. 
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Table 4. Additional Estimation 
(I) (II) (III)
Sample All Large Small
Outtariff 0.0028 0.0036 -0.0022
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
   * Exporter dummy -0.0010 -0.0071 0.0034
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
   * Proximity to frontier -0.0042
(0.017)
Intariff -0.0208* -0.0113** -0.0045
(0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
   * Importer dummy -0.0264** -0.0239* 0.0030
(0.013) (0.013) (0.067)
   * Proximity to frontier 0.0207
(0.020)
Exporter dummy 0.0247 0.1153 -0.0525
(0.054) (0.077) (0.077)
Importer dummy 0.2286** 0.1891* 0.0247
(0.104) (0.106) (0.525)
Proximity to frontier -0.3912* -0.3138*** -0.2645***
(0.233) (0.033) (0.035)
ln Output -0.0035 0.0002 -0.0255***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007)
Number of observations 4,562 2,400 2,162
R-squared 0.214 0.224 0.239  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log difference of quality. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively. In parenthesis is the robust standard error. In 
all specifications, year-island fixed effects are included. “Large” plants are defined as those in which 
the average of plant-level output values over time is greater than the median among all plants. 
 
  
20 
 
Figure 1. Consumers’ Decision Tree 
 
 
Domestic Apparel
Products
Outside Goods
(Domestic Apparel Products)
Product (Nest) 1
Product (Nest) 36
Firm (variety) 1
Firm (variety) j
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Types of Apparel Products 
Overcoats (1. for women; 2. for men)
Suits (3. for women; 4. for men)
Blazers/Jackets (5. for women; 6. for men)
Sweaters/Ensembles (7. for women; 8. for men)
Vests (9. for women; 10. for men)
Shirts/Blouses (11. for women; 12. for men)
Kebaya (13. for women)
Gowns (14. for women)
Skirts (15. for women)
Trousers (16. for women; 17. for men)
Other outer garments (18. for women; 19. for men)
Slips (20. for women)
Undershirts (21. for men)
Singlets (22. for women; 23. for men)
Underpants (24. for women; 25. for men)
Other underwears (26. for women; 27. for men)
Nightwears (28. for women; 29. for men)
Pajamas (30. for women; 31. for men)
Dressing gowns/(Bath)Robes (32. for women; 33. for men)
Brassieres/Corsets (34. for women)
T-shirts (35. unisex)
Sweaters/Vest/Other garments (36. unisex)  
Note: Kebaya is the traditional Indonesian dress. 
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Table A2. Basic Statistics 
Mean S.D. p10 p90
D.ln Price 0.0386 0.5837 -0.4929 0.5596
D.ln Quality -0.0218 0.2146 -0.2109 0.1842
Outtariff 14.1493 1.5099 13.4011 14.8739
   * Exporter dummy 4.8287 6.7560 0 14.8332
   * Proximity to frontier 7.5338 2.6274 4.8053 11.3889
Intariff 7.8642 1.0063 6.4400 8.8533
   * Importer dummy 0.8650 2.4753 0 6.6898
   * Proximity to frontier 4.1947 1.5068 2.6298 6.4864
Exporter dummy 0.3431 0.4748 0 1
Importer dummy 0.1103 0.3132 0 1
Proximity to frontier 0.5327 0.1759 0.3536 0.7995
ln Output 14.5056 1.6702 12.7004 17.0534  
 
